Abstract: We consider a bilevel model where the leader wants to maximize revenues from a taxation scheme, while the follower rationnally reacts to those tax levels. We focus our attention on the special case of a toll-setting problem de ned on a multicommodity transportation network. We show that the general problem is NP-complete, while particular instances are polynomially solvable. Numerical examples are given.
Introduction
We consider a general taxation model involving two levels of decision-making. The upper level (leader) imposes taxes on a speci ed set of goods or services while the lower level (follower) optimizes its own objective, taking into account the taxation scheme devised by the leader. Since we do not force nonnegativity constraints on taxes, our model can implicitly deal with subsidies, which can be viewed as negative taxes. In the eld of economics, this ts the principal/agent paradigm (see van Ackere 21] ) where the principal, fully aware of the agent's rational behaviour, induces cooperation from the agent through an incentive scheme. In the eld of mathematical programming, this problem belongs to the class of bilevel optimization problems where both objective functions are bilinear. Surprisingly, this class has never been studied from a theoretical point of view. The present paper is devoted to the theoretical and algorithmical properties of this taxation model. In particular we address the issues of computational complexity of both the general model and important subclasses of it.
In the rst part of the paper, we introduce the general model and reformulate it as a standard linear-linear (or simply linear) bilevel program. Based on this reduction process, we derive an economic interpretation for an optimal taxation strategy. Linear bilevel programs have been studied quite extensively. They constitute the simplest instance of bilevel programs, where the two objective functions and the constraints are linear. E cient implicit enumeration algorithms for their solution have been proposed by Bard White 2, 23] . Nonlinear bilevel models have previously been applied to network problems such as the network design prob-lem (see Marcotte 16] ) and to the management of electric utility demand (Hobbs and Nelson 9] ). A bilevel price control problem with linear upper level objective and bilinear lower level objective has been proposed, but not solved, by Bialas and Karwan 6] .
The linear bilevel programming problem has been shown to be NP-complete by Jeroslow 12] . Penalty schemes have been investigated, dating back to Aiyoshi and Shimizu 1] in the nonlinear case. Recently, Marcotte and Zhu 17] have generalized this result to bilevel problems where the lower level is described by a variational inequality. An annotated bibliography containing more than one hundred references on bilevel programming has been compiled by Vicente and Calamai 22] , while the books by Shimizu, Ishizuka and Bard 19] and Luo, Pang and Ralph 14] are devoted, in full or in part, to this subject.
In the second part of the paper, we focus our attention on the problem of setting tolls on a speci ed subset of arcs of a multicommodity transportation network. In this context the leader corresponds to the pro t-maximizing owner of the network, and the follower to users travelling between nodes of the network. The users are assigned to shortest paths with respect to a generalized cost equal to the sum of the actual cost of travel plus a money equivalent of travel time. This model is formulated as a bilevel program with bilinear objectives at both levels of decision and network constraints at the lower level. This problem is shown to be strongly NP-hard. However its lower level network structure makes for very interesting algorithmic considerations. In particular, special cases of the problem can be solved in polynomial time, using shortest path and transshipment algorithms applied to a modi ed network. Furthermore, the general problem can be e ciently reformulated as a mixed integer program with a small number of integer (indeed binary) variables, large instances of which can be solved within reasonable time.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a very general nonlinear model and study in detail its specialization to bilinear objectives. Section 3 is devoted to the theoretical and algorithmical analysis of the Toll Optimization Problem (TOP). We prove that the general optimization problem is NP-hard, and that important special cases can be solved in polynomial time. In Section 4, we illustrate the features of the TOP model by means of medium-sized example. In Section 5, we propose a multiclass extension of the basic model and conclude the paper.
2 A general taxation problem Let x and y be real vectors that specify the levels of taxed and untaxed activities (goods, services), and T be a tax vector attached to the activity vector x. For a given tax level vector T, in control of the leader, the follower strives to minimize its operating costs, while the leader seeks to maximize its revenues from taxes. Let where represents a set of constraints on taxes, and a set of constraints on the activities of the follower. If the lower level problem admits a unique solution denoted by (x(T); y(T)), implicitly de ned by the inner optimization problem in (1), it is possible to rewrite the above program in the form max T2 F(x(T); y(T); T): (2) Whenever the lower problem admits multiple solutions, ties are broken in favour of the leader. The above formulation is valid only if the set is compact. If is not compact, one may alternatively use the regularized gap function (see Fukushima 8]) f(x; y; T) = max In this paper, we restrict our attention to the situation where the leader maximizes its revenues from taxes restricted to the polyhedron = fT : TC eg de ned by a matrix C and a right-hand side vector e while, for given taxation levels, the lower level's reaction is The vector c corresponds to the \before tax" cost of the activity x. In order to gain some insight into the above problem, we discuss the example depicted in Figure 1 . For a given tax level T in R 1 , the optimal solution of the lower level problem is achieved at a vertex of the two-dimensional polyhedron . For instance, if T = 0, we have:
x(T) = x 0 y(T) = y 0 :
The vertex (x 0 ; y 0 ) remains optimal as long as T does not exceed some threshold value T 0 . For T less than or equal to T 0 , the leader's objective is a linear function of T, with slope x 0 . As T increases beyond T 0 , the vertex (x 0 ; y 0 ) is no longer optimal for the lower level's program.
Let (x 1 ; y 1 ) be the new optimal vertex; (x 1 ; y 1 ) remains optimal for T-values belonging to the interval (T 0 ; T 1 ]. Within this range, the slope of the leader's objective function is now x 1 , with x 1 < x 0 , obviously. The remainder of the process is self-explanatory. If T exceeds a su ciently large value (T 6 in our example), the optimal vertex is (x 7 ; y 7 ), with x 7 = 0, and the leader's pro t is driven to zero. The optimal solution is achieved at T = T 2 . The upper envelope of the leader's objective, taking into account the optimal reaction of the follower, is illustrated in Figure 2 . Figure 2 ). However, it is not di cult to prove that it is upper semicontinuous. Hence there exists at least one optimal solution to the general problem, and to TAX in particular.
Throughout the paper we make the following assumptions, to avoid trivial situations:
Assumption where the taxable vector x has now zero \before tax" cost.
With C and e set to zero, the next-to-last constraint of (4) The leader positions himself by selecting an (x; y)-vector such that any marginal deviation from this proposed solution by the follower will result in a large deterioration for the follower.
This gap between the leader's proposal and the follower's second best alternative provides room for taxation. It is in the interest of the leader to maintain this gap as wide as possible.
This is exactly what the above program (5) achieves. Indeed, the lower level in (5) strives to satisfy a marginal increase in demand Ax at the least possible cost, while setting x at the level prescribed by the leader.
If is set to zero, a value of dz 0 that is less or equal to that of dy can clearly be achieved by the follower, since the value dy corresponds to the feasible lower level program z 0 = y.
This means that, at best, the leader's objective is zero. The leader may achieve this optimal value zero by setting y to z 0 , where z 0 is an optimal response to any feasible vector x selected by the leader. If is positive, the follower optimally adjusts himself to the increased demand
Ax by adopting a recourse involving the sole vector z 0 . In the bilevel formulation (5), the leader wants to maximize the added cost of this recourse to the follower.
If the last inequality of (5) For xed x, the optimal solution of the mathematical program (5) is easily obtained by solving two linear programs parameterized in x. It follows that the objective of (5) is continuous, as the di erence of two convex, continuous functions of the vector x. This is to be contrasted with the situation illustrated in Figure 2 , where the pro t function is a piecewise linear but discontinuous function of the decision variable T.
A ROAD PRICING MODEL
In this section we focus on an application of the preceding model where an authority sets tolls on a speci ed subset of arcs of a transportation network, and the users of the network travel on shortest routes between their relative origins and destinations. While the aim pursued by the authority could be to improve the network performance through its toll policy, we assume that it simply seeks to maximize revenues. Such a model corresponds for instance to the setting of pro t maximizing tolls on a privately owned highway system. An optimal toll policy is such that toll levels are su ciently low not to deter the users from taking toll arcs rather than alternative routes, simultaneously generating high revenues. The route choice model that we adopt in this section is simplistic: we assume that the users travel on shortest origin-destination routes, and that congestion is not an in uential factor.
In this section we rst introduce the model and the notation, together with an integer programming formulation and a proof of NP-completeness; next we show that, under additional assumptions, the problem becomes polynomially solvable.
The model: formulations and computational complexity
Consider a multicommodity transportation network characterized by an underlying graph, a cost structure and demand for travel between vertices, given by an origin-destination matrix.
The leader is allowed to set taxes on a subset of the arcs of the network, while the remaining arcs bear only xed costs. For given tax levels, the network users minimize their generalized travel costs, which include two components, the rst being the tolls and the second the travel costs, exclusive of tolls. The cost of a route is de ned as the sum of the generalized costs of its arcs. The only constraints on tolls are lower bound constraints. Most of our results would extend easily to upper bounded tolls.
If one adopts the notation of In this formulation, the vector fx a g a2A 1 plays the role of x and fx a g a2A 2 plays the role of y in TAX.
In the remainder of the paper we assume that there cannot exist a toll setting scheme proportion of ow demand between origin node k and destination node l x kl a :
ow from origin k to destination l on arc a x a :
total ow on arc a, that generates pro ts and creates a negative cost cycle in the network, and that there exists at least one path composed solely of untolled arcs, for each origin-destination pair. These assumptions imply that the lower level optimal solution corresponds to a set of shortest paths and that the upper level pro t is bounded from above.
Using the ideas of Section 2, TOP can be reduced to a linear bilevel program. Furthermore, the characterization of lower level solutions as origin-destination paths carrying either no ow or the total origin-destination ow allows us to obtain an integer programming formulation of TOP that involves a small number of binary variables, namely Note that M can be polynomially related to the problem data, using the same approach as the one described for the constant K in equation (3) .
Even in this very restrictive setting of a single origin and a single destination, the next proposition shows that the toll setting problem is NP complete.
Theorem 1 TOP is strongly NP-complete.
Proof. Let us consider the decision problem de ned by the oracle:
Given a TOP instance and a rational pro t level , does there exist a toll vector T such that Tx exceeds and (x; y) is an optimal lower-level reaction to T?
First note that TOP can be formulated as the penalized bilinear program BILIN1 with constraints disjoint in (x; y) and . One of its optimal solution must occur at a vertex of the primal-dual polyhedron. Since there is a representation of vertices which is polynomially related to the problem data, and K is polynomially related to the extremal solutions (see (3)), we have that TOP is in NP.
We show that TOP is NP-complete by a reduction from the Directed Hamiltonian Path problem (DHP, see Garey and Johnson 11]) to TOP. Let G = (N; A) be a directed graph.
We seek an Hamiltonian path between two distinguished vertices s and t of N and show that this can be achieved by nding a polynomially related toll setting problem. Consider the toll problem de ned on the graph G = (N; A) where A = A f(s; t)g, all arcs of A are toll arcs and arc (s; t) (or its parallel copy) is an untolled arc. We set the initial costs to ?1 on toll arcs and to jNj ? 1 on the untolled arc (s; t). The lower bounds on tolls are set to 2. Demand from node s to node t is set to 1. We show that the existence of a toll strategy with revenue at least = 2(jNj ? 1) implies the existence of an s-t Hamiltonian path in G.
Let l denote the length of any s-t path. Since the maximum achievable pro t compatible with this path is jNj ? 1 + l, it is clearly optimal to set tolls onto the longest path of the network (with respect to the number of arcs), i.e. a Hamiltonian path, if such a path exists.
The toll values on toll arcs that do not lie on the selected longest path are set to jNj + 1, assuring that any alternative path has a cost higher than that of the selected longest path, and hence that users do not have cheaper alternatives.
2
Remark: If there exists an s-t Hamiltonian path P A, then an optimal solution of the toll setting problem is obtained by setting T ij = 2 if (i; j) is in P and T ij = jNj+1 otherwise.
The associated pro t is equal to 2jNj ? 2. Any policy that does not set tolls on the arcs of a Hamiltonian path results in a lower pro t. Hence, the solution of TOP on the modi ed graph yields a Hamiltonian path on the original graph, if such a path exists.
As an example, the graph of If kl is less than l a for all origin-destination couples (k; l), the pro t will be zero for all values of T a larger than l a .
The lower level path is known
The current and the next subsections are devoted to the single origin, single destination case. Without loss of generality, we assume that demand is equal to one. We denote by p 0 a shortest path from the origin s to the destination t obtained by setting all tolls to zero, and by p 1 the shortest s-t path obtained by setting all tolls to +1. Furthermore, let denote the di erence between the cost of p 1 and the cost of p 0 . Clearly, is an upper bound on the leader's pro t, and one might expect that, corresponding to an optimal toll vector, the ow be assigned to path p 0 . However, this need not be the case, as can be readily veri ed on the network of Figure 4 , where an optimal solution is given by T 23 = T 45 = T 15 = 7 and where ows are assigned to the path 1{5 rather than to the optimal path with respect to null tolls, i.e., p 0 = 1{2{3{4{5. Moreover, the upper bound = 12 ? 4 = 8 is not reached.
Figure 4 goes here
In this subsection, we develop an algorithm that determines optimal toll levels, given that the shortest path taken by the users is known a priori. In this case, optimal tolls can be obtained by solving for a shortest path in some modi ed graph G 0 , which is de ned in the statement of the next proposition.
Let p denote the selected shortest path. Without loss of generality, one may delete the toll arcs that are not part of path p ; this is equivalent to setting their toll to an arbitrary large value, thus ensuring that the ow on these arcs is zero. A common value T 1 suitable for all toll arcs not on p is given by If no shortest path exists, i.e., there exists a negative cycle in G 0 , then this implies that the program (6) is infeasible and we conclude that no vector of tolls can both satisfy the lower bound constraints and be compatible with p being a shortest s-t path. It is instructive to interpret the solution of this example within the framework of the linear bilevel program (5) . In order to conform with the requirement that the initial cost of the toll arcs be zero, we rst replace the toll arc (2,3) by an untolled arc (2; 2 0 ) with cost 2 and a toll arc (2 0 ; 3) with zero cost (see Figure 5 ). Next we reduce the ow on toll arcs by .
Since ow conservation is no longer satis ed, we must reroute this ow along untolled arcs, at lowest cost. This is achieved by solving the transshipment problem illustrated in Figure   5c , where a supply of , indicated by + is issued at nodes 2 0 and 4, and a demand of , indicated by ? , is issued at nodes 3 and 5. An optimal solution to this problem is obtained by sending a ow of along paths 2 0 {2{4{3 and 4{3{5, respectively. The added cost of this rerouting is equal to times (?2 + 9 ? 2) (cost of rst path) plus (?2 + 12) (cost of second path), i.e., 15 , and the optimal pro t 15 is obtained by dividing by . The dual variables, or node potentials, corresponding to this solution are
1. The complexity of the solution procedure is O(jNj 3 ), if one implements Ford-BellmanMoore's algorithm for nding the shortest path from s to t. If there are no lower bound constraints, and p is composed solely of toll arcs, then there are no reverse arcs, and Dijkstra's algorithm can be implemented, to yield an O(n 2 ) worst-case procedure.
2. It is easy to construct examples where the solution, contrary to this example, is not unique and (or) requires negative toll values. This is illustrated in Figure 6 where the We now solve a variant of the problem where the set of taxable arcs carrying positive ow is known a priori. Speci cally we show how to determine a path passing through the selected toll arcs that is used by the lower level, i.e., a shortest path with respect to total arc costs.
Once this path is identi ed, the problem reduces to the one resolved in subsection 3.3.
To this aim, let us partition the set of toll arcs as The validity of this construction is based on the fact that the ranking of the paths (with respect to their lengths) going through the imposed toll arcs is not in uenced by the actual values of the tolls. Hence the shortest such path can be determined without reference to the toll values, to be determined subsequently. Going back to the example illustrated in Figure   5a , we nd that the shortest path (actually the unique path) going through the toll arcs (2,3) and (4,5) is p =1{2{3{4{5. In this case, the above minimum cost ow problem has a trivial solution. This need not be always the case.
A Numerical example
In this section we illustrate our model by means of the instance of a network toll setting problem shown in Figure 7 . The problem involves four origin-destination pairs, 11 nodes and 25 arcs, seven of the latter being toll arcs (boldfaced arcs on the gure).
Two solution techniques have been tested. The rst is based on the reformulation of TOP as a linear bilevel program, along the lines of Section 2. The resulting bilevel program has 44
upper level ow conservation constraints, 44 lower level ow conservation constraints, 100, i.e., 4 25, upper level variables, 72 (4 (25?7)) lower level variables, and opposite objectives.
By today's standards this is a hard, medium-sized bilevel program, which we solved using a state-of-the-art algorithm of Hansen, Jaumard and Savard 10]. The di culty of the problem is re ected in the large number of nodes of the implicit enumeration tree that had to be explored before reaching an optimal solution and getting a certi cate of optimality. We observed that the algorithm was somewhat insensitive to the value of the penalty parameter K. Indeed, feasible solutions were reported for quite small values of K, and we could report no numerical instability problems. Whatever the foreseeable improvements in bilevel algorithms, we do not believe that this approach could address much larger instances of TOP.
The mixed integer reformulation, on the other hand, e ciently exploits the combinatorial structure of the problem, i.e., the fact that the lower level's extremal solution are paths and can be represented by binary variables. Using this approach, problems based on the network of Figure 7 could be solved in less than 1 second on a Sun Sparc 10, using GAMS{CPLEX 2.1. This leads us to believe that much larger instances could be routinely solved using this formulation.
Figure 7 goes here
Three scenarios were considered. The rst is the base scenario. In the second scenario, demand is increased on origin-destination pair 1{3. In the third scenario, nonnegativity constraints on the tolls are incorporated into the model. The optimal solutions are shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4. For Scenario I, no pro ts are achieved for travellers going from origin 1 to destination 3. As the demand on that pair is increased from 12 to 20 in Scenario II, tolls, even negative ones, are introduced (see Table 3 ). When nonnegativity constraints on tolls are imposed (Scenario III), a new solution, with lower overall pro t, is obtained (see Table   4 ). It is interesting to notice that ows are not always assigned to the shortest path with respect to null tolls. For instance, in Scenario I, the nal path for the origin-destination pair 1{3 is 1{4{3 (with initial and nal cost 20) while the initial shortest path is 1{10{9{11{3
(with initial cost 12). Table 5 Finally, in order to assess the potential of the mixed integer reformulation, we applied it to 12 larger instances of TOP. Speci cally, the second test network consists in a 5 12 grid of bidirectional arcs (60 nodes, 206 arcs). Costs were generated according to independent uniform random variables over the interval 2, 20] . The probability that an arc be tollable was set to 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, and 0.20. Three instances were generated for each value of .
OD demand path path toll path xed cost total cost pro t 1{3  12  1{4{3  0  20  240  0  1{2  8  1{10{2  11  12  184  88  2{4  16  2{6{5{8{4  6  14  320  96  2{3  10  2{11{3  14  160  300  140  TOTAL PROFIT: 324  arc: (1,10) (5,8) (6,9) (7,3) (9,7) (10,9) (11,3) toll: 11 6 4 16 0 0 14 The number of origin-destination pairs was xed to 20. All problems with less than or equal to 0.10 were solved to optimality with CPU times ranging from 155 to 3969 seconds.
The number of explored nodes in the branch-and-bound tree varied from 106 to 2114. For 0.15 or 0.20, an optimal solution was not reached for two out of six instances within 24 CPU hours. This shows the limitations of the approach: it solves medium-sized instances.
Conclusion and extensions
The model introduced in this paper constitutes a rst attempt at understanding, both from the theoretical and algorithmical points of view, an important class of decision problems. At this step, it is clear that we had no intention of incorporating into our model all the features of a real-life application. In particular, our representation of user behaviour is overly simplistic OD demand path path toll path xed cost total cost pro t 1{3  20  1{10{9{11{3  8  12  400  160  1{2  8  1{10{2  0  12  96  0  2{4  16  2{6{5{8{4  6  14  320  96  2{3  10  2{11{3  8  16  240  80  TOTAL PROFIT: 336  arc: (1,10) (5,8) (6,9) (7,3) (9,7) (10,9) (11,3) toll: 0 6 4 7 0 0 8 in that it assumes no dispersion of tra c along the routes of the network. A dispersion e ect could be achieved simply by incorporating volume-delay curves. A more irksome assumption of our toll model is that the value-of-time parameter is uniform throughout the user population, and that, given the choice between two paths of equal costs, the users always select the one with the highest toll. Both these drawbacks could be eliminated by introducing a range of value-of-time parameters across users. For instance (see Leurent 13] ), let denote the value-of-time parameter associated with a cross-section of the user population, and assume that is distributed according to a function H( ) whose derivative h( ) is the associated density function, i.e.:
H 0 ( ) = h( ) h( ) 0 This opens up the possibility of addressing the toll setting problem as a smooth program, allowing the implementation of nonlinear programming algorithms, as proposed in 14]. Note that this does not make the problem convex, i.e., we stay in the realm of global optimization.
However, this could facilitate the search for`good' local solutions. 
